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This article assesses the adequacy of informed consent to clinical genetic testing laws based on an
examination of 15 states with institutions that had been involved in a National Institutes of
Health-supported Clinical Sequencing Exploratory Research Consortium project. We identified rel-
evant statutory provisions through a legal search engine and included statutes that describe the
informed consent requirements for clinical genetic testing and/or the protections for genetic mate-
rial, information, or data. We found that statutory definitions were often limited in problematic
ways, such as focusing only on variants known to be associated with disease or negative health
effects or associated with asymptomatic disease. Some statutes required complex levels of detail if
applied to genomic technologies and set confusing disclosure standards for current use and future
access. Others had exceptions from informed consent requirements for future research use, limited
requirements for the destruction of specimens as opposed to derived data, or linked key defini-
tional components to the evolving concept of “identifiability.” Further reform and research are
needed to ensure that state law protections advance as rapidly as the science they aspire to
enable.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The informed consent process is the main mechanism through which
we protect and enable patients’ decision-making. Many states have
recognized informed consent for clinical genetic testing as an area
warranting special protections, but such laws were generally concep-
tualized in an era when genetic tests involved targeted analysis for
disease and provided specific and limited information about a single
variant. Since that time, fundamental advances in genetic technolo-
gies—including approaches such as whole genome or exome
sequencing, microarrays, and other technologies that allow simulta-
neous analysis of many genes—have transformed clinical genetic
testing. It is therefore critical for genetic counselors, who are often
involved in obtaining consent from patients for genetic testing, to
consider how best to counsel patients in making good health-care
decisions for themselves going forward. Part of addressing that
question involves examining whether these laws are adequately tai-
lored toward enabling such conversations.
In general, most of the original clinical genetic testing laws paired
requirements for informed consent with protections against noncon-
sensual use of genetic information. This was motivated by the goal of
restricting insurers (especially health insurers) or employers from using
genetic information against customer or employee interests (Yesley,
1997). Given the sweeping changes in the science of genomic testing,
this article seeks to assess the adequacy of current genetic-specific
state laws on informed consent based on an examination of 15 states.
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We undertook this analysis as a subgroup of the Informed Consent and
Governance Working Group of the first stage of the Clinical Sequenc-
ing Exploratory Research (CSER1) Consortium, which explored chal-
lenges to integrating genetic sequencing into clinical settings (Green
et al., 2016).
Past summaries and critiques of state genetic testing laws have gen-
erally focused on a specific type or context of genetic testing—for exam-
ple, whole genome sequencing, health insurance, employment, research
—or were completed prior to the development of the most recent
genomic technologies (Hakimian, Taube, Bledsoe, & Aamodt, 2004; Hall
& Rich, 2000; McEwen & Reilly, 1992; PCSBI, 2012; ; Rothenberg,
1995; Rothenberg et al., 1997). Here we focus on the current intersec-
tion of the law with a wide array of modern testing technologies, and
conclude that in many states informed consent laws for clinical genetic
testing as currently written pose significant challenges and are not suited
to address modern technologies. Although genetic counselors must
work within the confines of current law, we recommend that when in
gray zones or areas of conflict, they should focus on information that
aligns with stated patient values and comports with the spirit of the law:
helping patients make better-informed decisions for themselves and
their families. Finally, we recognize that genetic counselors will have an
important role to play as advocates for improved statutes.
2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
We examined state laws specific to informed consent for genetic
testing from 15 states where institutions that had been involved in a
CSER1 Consortium project were located (AL, CA, MD, MA, MI, MN,
MO, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, TN, TX, WA). Although CSER is a research
program, it focuses on the integration of genome sequencing in clini-
cal care. Thus, these states are among those most likely to have the
laboratories, geneticists, and technologies available for rapid intro-
duction of advanced genetic technologies into clinical care—making
them appropriate targets for an examination of laws related to
informed consent.
Informed consent rules are derived from a complex intersection
of state and federal case law, statutes, and regulations (e.g., state
laws on general clinical informed consent and relevant federal anti-
discrimination legislation such as the Americans with Disabilities Act
[ADA] and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act). Our
research here focuses on state statutes addressing informed consent
for clinical genetic testing. These statutes arguably not only play the
greatest role in shaping day-to-day informed consent disclosures but
also create variability for providers across the country. We identified
relevant state statutory provisions through the legal search engine
LexisNexis Academic, using search terms “genetic OR genomic AND
test OR testing,” as well as “‘genetic information’ AND consent OR
authorization.” We narrowed these findings by including only those
that related to genetic material, information, or data. We excluded
statutes that only included discrimination protections or “opt-outs”
as well as those that did not focus on informed consent to clinical
genetic testing. Ten of the 15 CSER states (CA, MD, MA, MI, MN,
MO, NY, OR, TN, TX) had laws that met our inclusion criteria (Sup-
porting Information).
Prior to data collection, the authors identified categories of informa-
tion to be collected. Initially, two authors (KSB, AP) collected data from
six pilot states for review. The research team then iteratively organized
information into categories based on previous state reviews. Two
authors (KSB, AP) then undertook statute identification and data collec-
tion. Through a series of group discussions, the team identified areas on
which to focus our analysis, relevant critiques, and conclusions.
3 | RESULTS
Here we focus on three areas that we hypothesize would be of most
relevance to genetic counselors affected by modern advances in
genetic science and technology: (a) the definitional scope of informed
consent protections, (b) the content of informed consent disclosures,
and (c) the possible future research use of specimens collected in the
clinical context. We also present and analyze the state statutes relating
to these areas while highlighting potential issues for practicing
clinicians.
3.1 | Scope of protections
First we examined the definitions (i.e., “genetic characteristic,” “genetic
information,” or “genetic test”) that set the scope of subsequent informed
consent protections in light of new genomic technologies—including pro-
tections for testing, use, retention, disclosure, and future research use of
clinical specimens or data (e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 § 70G(c)(1),
2016; Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3829a(7), 2016; Minn. Ann. Stat. §
13.386(Subd. 3)(a)(3), 2016; Cal. Insurance Code § 742.407(b), 2016;
MD. Code Ann., Ins. § 27–909(d), 2016). We found these definitions to
be limited in several problematic ways for genetic counselors seeking to
explain them in the consent process, including that they focus only on
variants known to be associated with disease or negative health effects or
variants associated with asymptomatic disease—whereas a genetic coun-
selor’s actual practice often goes beyond such limits (Table 1).
In five of the states surveyed (CA, MD, MI, MN, TX), the definition
of genetic characteristic, test, or predisposition was limited to variants
that are known, determined, or scientifically or medically accepted or
believed to be associated with disease, disorder, or mutation (Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 1374.7(d), 2012 (incorporated by reference in
Cal. Civil Code § 56.17(h), 2017); Cal. Insurance Code § 10147, 2000;
MD. Code Ann., Ins. § 27–909(5), 2016; Mich. Comp. Laws §
333.17020(8)(b); Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17520(8)(b), 2016; Minn.
Ann. Stat. § 72A.139(Subd. 2)(b), 2016; Tex. Insurance Code Ann. §
546.001(2); Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.401(3), 2016; Tex. Occupational
Code Ann. § 58.001(3), 2016). Limiting variants to those medically
accepted as associated with disease is inadequate for the scope and
scale of results that genetic counselors might return in clinical care, and
provides no guidance on other types of information. For example, the
clinical genetics community has established the following range of clas-
sifications for genetic variants: benign, likely benign, variants of uncer-
tain significance, likely pathogenic, and pathogenic (Richards et al.,
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2015). But what do the legal definitions mean when taken in conjunc-
tion with these classifications? Are variants that are “likely pathogenic”
or “pathogenic” “medically accepted” while the others are not? The
answer is unclear.
A second-related issue is that even variants that are not medically
accepted as being associated with a disorder may be strongly sus-
pected of being pathogenic or may be associated with conditions or
behaviors that—while not constituting illnesses—are nevertheless stig-
matizing (e.g., the association of the MAOA-L variant with impulsive
and antisocial behavior [Fergusson, Boden, Horwood, Miller, & Ken-
nedy, 2011]). Also, evolving scientific knowledge creates the possibility
that the legal status of certain test results might be reclassified in the
future (Mahon, 2015). This is problematic when genetic counselors
need to know prospectively which tests are covered by genetic-
specific informed consent statutes.
In six states (CA, MD, MI, MN, NY, TX), the definition of genetic
characteristic, information, test, or predisposition was limited to a test
or variant associated with a negative health effect (Cal. Insurance Code
§ 10147(b), 2000; MD. Code Ann., Ins. § 27–909(5), 2016; Mich.
Comp. Laws § 333.17020(8)(c), 2016; Minn. Ann. Stat. § 62A.31(Subd.
8)(j)(2), 2016; Minn. Ann. Stat. § 72A.139(Subd. 2)(b), 2016; N.Y. Civil
Rights Law § 79-l(1)(a-b), 2016; N.Y. Human Rights Law § 292(21-a),
2016; Tex. Occupational Code Ann. § 58.001(3), 2016). This means
that genetic-specific clinical informed consent may not be required by
the statutes for variants associated with positive health effects (e.g.,
A673T in the APP gene, which helps protect against Alzheimer’s dis-
ease [Jonsson et al., 2012]). But current genetic technologies fre-
quently yield data about several categories of findings, for example,
positive and negative associations with diseases, drug metabolism,
nondisease-associated traits, ancestry, and variants of uncertain signifi-
cance (VUS) or associated with more than one phenotypic condition.
Statutes that limit their scope to disease-associated findings might
therefore be difficult to apply when access to or release of the entire
data set is in question.
Another limitation of note is that in five states (CA, MD, MA, MN,
TX), definitions were limited to genetic characteristics, information, or
tests “presently not associated” with symptoms (i.e., protections were
limited to persons who were asymptomatic or presymptomatic) or not
related to manifest disease (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1374.7(d),
2012 (incorporated by reference in Cal. Civil Code § 56.17(h), 2017);
Cal. Insurance Code § 10147(b), 2000; MD. Code Ann., Ins. § 27–909
(a)(3), 2016; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 § 70G(a), 2016; Minn. Ann. Stat.
§ 62A.31(Subd. 8)(j)(4), 2016; Tex. Insurance Code Ann. § 546.001(4);
Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.401(5), 2016; Tex. Occupational Code Ann.
§ 58.001(5), 2016). The clinical genetic informed consent protections in
these states thus do not cover testing done after the onset of symp-
toms. Granted, these definitions generally arose in the context of con-
cern about discrimination against asymptomatic individuals and other
antidiscrimination laws, such as the ADA, might protect patients once
symptomatic. However, in 2001 the New York Task Force on Life and
the Law (the “Task Force”) recommended that such definitions be
expanded to cover all genetic information (Carroll & Coleman, 2001).
But not only has this definitional problem yet to be resolved, it has
been exacerbated by the advent of genetic technologies employed as
diagnostic tools when symptoms already exist, but are of unknown eti-
ology (Saunders et al., 2012).
3.2 | Required disclosures for informed consent
A second area of particular interest is the information that is required
to be disclosed during the informed consent process, such as discussion
of the nature and purpose of the genetic test (which all states with dis-
closure requirements mandate). But notably, only four of the states we
examined delineate specific disclosure requirements: CA (whose statute
uses the term “written authorization,” has content similar to other
states’ informed consent laws and thus was included in our analysis),
MA, MI, and NY (Cal. Civil Code § 56.17(g), 2017; Cal. Insurance Code
§ 742.407(g), 2016; Cal. Insurance Code § 10123.35(g), 2017; Cal.
Insurance Code § 10140.1(g), 2017; Cal. Insurance Code § 10148(a),
2000; Cal. Insurance Code § 10149.1(g), 2000; Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
111 § 70G(a), 2016; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17020(2), 2016; Mich.
Comp. Laws § 333.17520(2), 2016; N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-l(2)(b),
2016; N.Y. Insurance Law § 2615(b), 2015). Overall, we found that
these statutes require disclosure of complex levels of detail, often
require descriptions of options for destruction of biospecimens while
ignoring the resulting data, and set confusing standards for disclosure
regarding authorized parties and future access (Table 2). However, we
note that they also might require provision of written information
TABLE 1 Examples of state statutory definitions of “genetic test” or “characteristic”
Statutory example Limitation
Genetic characteristic: “any scientifically or medically identifiable gene or chromosome, or alteration thereof,
that is known to be a cause of a disease or disorder, or that is determined to be associated with a statistically
increased risk of development of a disease or disorder . . .”a (CA)
To variants known or associated
with disease or disorder
Genetic test: “a laboratory test . . . used to identify the presence or absence of inherited or congenital
alterations in genetic material that are associated with disease or illness.”b (MD)
To tests associated with negative
health effects
Genetic test: “. . . a presymptomatic test of a person’s genes, gene products, or chromosomes for the purpose
of determining the presence or absence of a gene or genes that exhibit abnormalities, defects, or
deficiencies, including carrier status, that are known to be the cause of a disease or disorder, or are
determined to be associated with a statistically increased risk of development of a disease or disorder.”c (MN)
To a presymptomatic test
aCal. Insurance Code § 10147(b) (2000)
bMD. Code Ann., Ins. § 27–909(5) (2016)
cMinn. Ann. Stat. § 72A.139(Subd. 2)(B) (2016).
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identifying a geneticist or genetic counselor as an added resource
(Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 § 70G(a), 2016).
Other disclosure categories include risks and benefits; reliability,
effectiveness, or level of certainty of results; or whether any other tests
will be performed on the sample (Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17020(2),
2016; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17520(2), 2016; Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
111 § 70G(a), 2016; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17020(2), 2016; N.Y.
Civil Rights Law § 79-l(2)(b), 2016; N.Y. Insurance Law § 2615(b), 2015;
N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-l(2)(b), 2016). But again, current genomic
technologies may identify variants associated with a large number of
conditions; having to disclose specific risks, benefits, and implications
for all of them is challenging, if not impossible. New York requires that
“the level of certainty that a positive test result for that disease or con-
dition serves as a predictor of such disease” be disclosed, although it
acknowledges that if “no level of certainty has been established” that
requirement may be disregarded (N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-l(2)(b),
2016; N.Y. Insurance Law § 2615(b), 2015). But, the predictive validity
of genomic analyses may depend on the variant in question.
New York also addresses duration of authorization or length of
retention of a sample. The sample needs to be destroyed “not more
than sixty days after the sample was taken, unless a longer period of
retention is expressly authorized . . .” (N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-l(2)(b),
2016). However, as discussed further below, it is more often the data
(not the sample) that could be transferred to a databank and stored
indefinitely for secondary research or other purposes, potentially gen-
erating privacy concerns for an individual that are relevant to the
informed consent discussion.
All of the states require disclosure of which persons or entities
would have access to the information or sample. While access to
human biospecimens is an area heavily regulated by other federal and
state laws, access to the information or data generated by a genetic
test remains an important aspect of patient privacy and the informed
consent process. Massachusetts and New York address access by
describing the persons or entities who may be told the results, Michi-
gan describes the persons who have access to the sample and
information, and California describes those authorized to disclose infor-
mation (Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 § 70G(a), 2016; N.Y. Civil Rights Law
§ 79-l(2)(b), 2016; N.Y. Insurance Law § 2615(b), 2015; Mich. Comp.
Laws § 333.17020(2), 2016; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17520(2), 2016;
Cal. Civil Code § 56.17(g), 2017; Cal. Insurance Code § 742.407(g),
2016; Cal. Insurance Code § 10123.35(g), 2017; Cal. Insurance Code §
10140.1(g), 2017; Cal. Insurance Code § 10149.1(g), 2000). Addressing
not only who has access to the sample, but also who has access to the
information generated from the sample is critical in light of new technol-
ogies as the amount of data that can be generated from a single sample
has grown exponentially. The resultant information implicates informed
consent discussions not just about privacy risks, but also about benefits
as information might be useful to family members, and—through sec-
ondary research—could potentially yield family-specific variant
discovery.
3.3 | Research use and identifiability
The last area we queried is secondary research use of biospecimens
and genetic data and information generated in the clinical context.
Potential research use is relevant to the genetic counselor’s informed
consent process because a patient’s clinical test results, data, or sam-
ples may be used for future research in some circumstances, and could
even be of direct relevance to patients and families if those results are
returned. In addition, the clinician and researcher may be the same per-
son. If specimens or data remain identifiable, then research with that
material is often governed by the federal Common Rule; but if the
materials cannot readily be reidentified, it is generally not considered
human subjects research (45 C.F.R. § 46, 2009). However, the potential
for future research use may still raise disclosure concerns for clinicians.
Many of the state laws we analyzed had limitations related to excep-
tions from informed consent for future research use or destruction
requirements targeting specimens as opposed to derived data, or
rested their requirements on the data’s “identifiability”—a rapidly evolv-
ing concept (Table 3).




Prior written consent: “. . . shall include: (1) a statement of the purpose of the test; (2) a statement that prior to
signing the consent form, the consenting person discussed with the medical practitioner ordering the test the
reliability of positive or negative test results and the level of certainty that a positive test result for that
disease or condition serves as a predictor of such disease; (3) a statement that the consenting person was
informed about the availability and importance of genetic counseling and provided with written information
identifying a genetic counselor or medical geneticist from whom the consenting person might obtain such
counseling; (4) a general description of each specific disease or condition tested for; and (5) the person or
persons to whom the test results may be disclosed.”a (MA)
Nature and purpose
Written informed consent: “. . . includes . . . a statement that the sample shall be destroyed at the end of the
testing process or not more than sixty days after the sample was taken, unless a longer period of retention is
expressly authorized in the consent . . .”b (NY)
Period of retention
Written authorization: “. . . Specifies the types of persons authorized to disclose information about the
individual . . . [and] states the name or functions of the persons or entities authorized to receive the
information . . .”c (CA)
Nature of access
aMass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 § 70G(a) (2016).
bN.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-l(2)(b) (2016).
cCal. Civil Code § 56.17(g) (2017).
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In our review, seven states (CA, MA, MI, MO, NY, OR, TX) had
some exceptions to the requirements for clinical informed consent for
future research use (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 124980(j), 2017;
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 § 70G(b), 2016; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 §
70G(c)(2), 2016; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.17020(9), 2016; Mich.
Comp. Laws § 333.17520(9), 2016; MO. Ann. Stat. § 375.1309, 2017;
N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-l(4)(a), 2016; OR. Rev. Stat. § 192.535(1),
2015; OR. Rev. Stat. § 192.540, 2015; OR. Rev. Stat. § 192.547(7)(b),
2015; Tex. Insurance Code Ann. § 546.054, 2016; Tex. Labor Code
Ann. § 21.4031(b), 2016; Tex. Occupational Code Ann. § 58.103(b),
2016). Previous 50-state surveys have confirmed this finding—more
than half of states have such research exceptions (Hakimian et al.,
2004). As noted above, federal research regulations might offer some
protection, but with limits (45 C.F.R. § 46, 2009). When research is
exempted from consent requirements, persons who would decline to
have their samples used for particular kinds of research are unable to
do so and such laws might incentivize de-identified research to begin
with. Therefore, not only do state laws offer inadequate protections
that are too limited for the informed consent concerns of some
patients, but also—in light of less burdensome requirements for de-
identified secondary research—they can unintentionally create barriers
for return of research results that might be beneficial for participants
and their families.
Three of these seven states (NY, OR, TX) also specifically dis-
cuss destruction of a biological specimen (N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-
l(9)(b), 2016; OR. Rev. Stat. § 192.537(4,5), 2015; Tex. Insurance
Code Ann. § 546.054, 2016). For example, under New York’s Civil
Rights Law, anonymous samples may be used for IRB-approved
research without specific consent if the donor had consented to
general secondary research use. But if that consent to storage is
withdrawn, the sample (or portions that have not already been used
for research) must be promptly destroyed (N.Y. Civil Rights Law §
79-l(9)(b), 2016). However, these statutes focus on destruction of
the specimens themselves, rather than the data derived from them—
a major limitation given the breadth and value of genomic data once
generated (Annas, 2001).
A final area of focus is the use of the term “identifiability.” The
scope of identifiability is addressed by several different federal statu-
tory schemes that have been analyzed elsewhere (Majumder, Guerrini,
Bollinger, Cook-Deegan, & McGuire, 2017). In our review, seven states
(CA, MD, MA, MN, NY, OR, TX) have at least one statute that is
founded on the identifiability of a contributor from their specimen,
information, or data (Cal. Civil Code § 56.17(b), 2017; Cal. Insurance
Code § 742.407(b), 2016; MD. Code Ann., Ins. § 27–909(c)(3), 2016;
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 § 70G(a), 2016; Minn. Ann. Stat. § 144.192
(Subd. 1)(b), 2016; N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 79-l(9)(a), 2016; OR. Rev.
Stat. § 192.537(2), 2015; Tex. Insurance Code Ann. § 546.103(b),
2016). For example, in California, anyone who willfully discloses a
genetic result that “identifies or provides identifying characteristics of
the person” without written authorization from that person will be
assessed a civil penalty (Cal. Insurance Code § 742.407(d), 2016). In
Massachusetts, the very definition of “genetic information” is limited to
an “individually identifiable result” of a genetic test, leading George
Annas in 2001 to observe that it “seeks both to protect individual pri-
vacy and to promote genetic research. It accomplishes the latter, but
only at the expense of the former . . .” (Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111 § 70G
(a), 2016; Annas, 2001). But technologies have advanced to the point
that identification of a single person’s data from an aggregate data set
might be possible (Gymrek, McGuire, Golan, Halperin, & Erlich, 2013).
While reidentification is highly unlikely, this possibility at least chal-
lenges the widely held conception of binary categories of “identifiable”
and “de-identified.”
4 | DISCUSSION
Our research focused on three areas of informed consent legislation
that are of particular relevance to genetic counselors employing mod-
ern genetic testing technologies. We found several areas where these
TABLE 3 Examples of state statutory exemption provisions on research use and identifiability
Exceptions Statutory example
Research exception “A person may not obtain genetic information from an individual, or from an individual’s DNA sample, without
first obtaining informed consent of the individual or the individual’s representative, except . . . for anonymous
research or coded research conducted under conditions described in ORS 192.537(2) [e.g., they have granted
specific consent, broad consent, or have been notified that their specimen or information may be
deidentified and used for research], after notification pursuant to ORS 192.538 [Notification by health care
provider regarding anonymous or coded research] or pursuant to ORS 192.547 (7)(b)[the appropriate




“A sample of genetic material obtained from an individual for a genetic test shall be destroyed promptly after
the purpose for which the sample was obtained is accomplished unless . . . the individual authorizes retention
of the sample for medical treatment or scientific research [or] the sample was obtained for research that is
cleared by an institutional review board and retention of the sample is: (A) under a requirement the
institutional review board imposes on a specific research project; or (B) authorized by the research
participant with institutional review board approval under federal law . . .”b (TX)
Exceptions to redisclosure
rules if not identifiable
“A health benefit plan issuer may redisclose genetic information without an authorization . . . for actuarial or
research studies if a tested individual could not be identified in any actuarial or research report and any
materials that identify a tested individual are returned or destroyed as soon as reasonably practical . . .”c (TX)
aOr. Rev. Stat. § 192.535(1) (2015).
bTex. Insurance Code Ann. § 546.054 (2016).
cTex. Insurance Code Ann. § 546.103(b) (2016).
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laws—specifically tailored to protecting patients during informed con-
sent to clinical genetic testing—are profoundly limited or confusing
when applied to the current realities of this advancing technology.
Many state laws do not cover the return of test results that fall
outside the scope of disease-causing variants, thus oddly limiting
informed consent requirements for the growing body of results that
patients and families might seek (e.g., disease-protective results, uncer-
tain results, results related to asymptomatic conditions). Retaining
these distinct genetic testing laws will require periodic updates to
ensure they do not improperly exclude subsets of results, and that dis-
closure requirements are tailored to modern genetic and genomic test-
ing technologies. In addition, clinical genetic testing legislation should
consider the porous flow of resulting specimens and data to secondary
contexts such as research, learning health systems, or quality improve-
ment initiatives (Spector-Bagdady & Jagsi, 2018). The ongoing impulse
to protect privacy, motivating de-identification of biospecimens and
related data for research, may unduly restrict return of relevant results
that could be of benefit to patients and families. As such, the overall
inadequacy of state laws presents potential challenges for genetic
counselors as they seek to inform and support patients and families in
making testing decisions. These discrepancies and complications often
leave genetic professionals in the position of focusing on enabling good
decision-making for their patients and their families according to their
best professional judgment—yet unsure where this practice situates
them vis-a-vis existing state law.
From a future advocacy standpoint, clinicians—especially genetic
counselors—along with affected families, have much at stake and offer a
critical perspective on how state laws can provide relevant protections
that simultaneously facilitate realizing the potential benefits of disclosing
genetic information. There is recent precedent for effective advocacy
from the clinical and research communities on the topic of clinical
genetic testing: leading, for example, to intensive media coverage of the
American Society of Human Genetics’ letter regarding the “Preserving
Employee Wellness Programs Act,” and the veto of Wyoming’s recent
Genetic Information Privacy law due to concerns that an amendment
“could be interpreted to prohibit genetic testing facilities, research facili-
ties and even universities from using a third party to store or back up”
data (Mead, 2017; Sun, 2017). Genetic counselors can act as a critical
resource for state legislatures, as well as within their institutions, by clari-
fying how such laws impact patients and families on a daily basis and the
complex obligations (e.g., selecting a laboratory, selecting a test, disclos-
ing risks and benefits of that test) that clinicians face.
In conjunction with specific advocacy efforts, uniformity across
jurisdictions would also be desirable for clinicians practicing, and speci-
mens traveling, across state lines. But it is unclear whether state legisla-
tures have the bandwidth or expertise to formulate and maintain such
updated policies. Incorporation of specific provisions into regulations,
rather than embodying them in statutory language—with an appropri-
ate state health agency charged with updating them as needed—may
be a more reasonable approach.
Our study had several limitations—most notably that we confined
our review to 15 states, all of which have major institutions that con-
duct genomic research such that they might not be representative of
all U.S. states. We have also highlighted what we identified as major
issues across these states; other problems may exist within these indi-
vidual states’ laws that we did not review here. We also limited our
search terms to focus on clinical genetic testing or information and
therefore might have excluded some statutes of potential interest.
Also, informed consent is governed by a complex intersection of stat-
utes, regulations, and case law; here we focused our review on state
statutes requiring explicit informed consent to clinical genetic testing.
Despite these limitations, this review provides a valuable perspective
on the complexities that can arise in the context of genetic-specific
consent laws and rapidly advancing genomic technologies.
While genomic technologies are changing the nature of testing,
the goals of clinical informed consent have generally stayed the same:
to inform patients of the potential benefits, risks, implications, and use
of tests and data being generated. Science often advances more rapidly
than the laws that govern it; genetic-specific clinical informed consent
laws must strike a balance between adequate specificity to protect
patients and enough flexibility to ensure those continued protections
in the context of advancing technology. Too often these laws, theoreti-
cally enacted specifically to support the process of informed consent to
genetic testing, constrain and confound as much as clarify. We must
aim to protect scientific progress for our patients, as well as to promote
the biospecimen and data donations that will enable better health
decision-making and outcomes for our future patients. Reform efforts
and further research are needed to ensure that state law protections
advance as rapidly as the science they aspire to enable.
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